HUMAN AS AN ETHICAL BEING A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY ON KANTIAN ANTHROPOLOGY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Kant’s ethical thought is possibly both the finest and most characteristic product of the Enlightenment period. His ethical thought is a best resource in normative theories, in ethics, political philosophy and public policy. His ethical theory is not simply a morality of serious principles but an ethics of mutual respect and self-esteem. It is grounded on the dignity of the rational nature, and includes the respect for individual rights and the equal value of human beings.

Kant’s philosophy in its original form had contributed a lot to the social, political and economical spheres of then Europe. It also promoted feeling of tolerance towards religions and different cultures. He tried to show that the laws of nature and laws of morality are grounded in human reason itself. He has certainly done a commendable effort in distinguishing difference between nature and freedom. Ultimately, Kant held the view that both the laws of nature and the laws of free human conduct must be compatible, because they are both product of human thought imposed by us on the data of our experience by the exercise of our own power to reason. He distinguished philosophy as science of human being. This is clearly stated in his last book, The Conflict of the Faculties (1798) as “Philosophy is not some sort of representations, concepts and ideas, or science of all sciences, or anything of this sort; rather it is a science of human beings.”

Kant derived the fundamental principles of human thought and action, from human sensibility, understanding and reason and all of them derived as a source of human’s autonomy. He balanced these principles against the external sensations and the internal inclinations beyond our own control. He tried to integrate these principles into human autonomy as both its foundation and ultimate value and goal. In his works, Critique of Practical Reason and Groundworks of Metaphysics of Morals, he argued that, “Reason as the source of the ideal of systematicity is the source of the fundamental law of morality and the consciousness of our own freedom, which is the source of all value and that we can postulate the fundamental dogmas of Christianity, our own immortality and the existence of God as practical presupposition of our moral conduct.”

Ethics deals with the human nature. When I thought of doing my dissertation on the nature of human being, I thought it is explicitly right to analyze human being from an ethical perspective. While analyzing the ethical concepts of various philosophers I found the ethical principles of Immanuel Kant quiet interesting, especially his Categorical Imperatives and Postulates of morality. In the contemporary consumerist society, where everything including human being is considered just as a commodity, and in a use and through culture, I found his proclamation to consider humans as an end in themselves is meaningful.

My dissertation with the title, Human as an Ethical Being: A Descriptive Study on Kantian Anthropology, is an effort to find out the essence of Kantian morality in defining human as an ethical person. For that purpose I tried to analyze the Kantian concept of Autonomy, Free will, freedom, obligation etc. because they are important elements of human moral nature. They are capable of raising questions like whether man is free or not, is it justifiable to harm others in order to save one’s own life etc.

The first chapter deals with the life and works of Immanuel Kant, where it is divided into two parts, in the first part his childhood, his life as a student and a professor; background of his philosophical thinking etc. is discussed. The second part summarized explanation of his three important critiques, the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment.

The second chapter is the core of this dissertation. It is the discussion on the anthropological concepts of Kant assuming human as a moral being. This chapter consists of five parts. The first part is a discussion on the autonomy and concept of free will in human beings. The second part is a brief discussion on his postulates of morality such as God, immortality and freedom. The third part mainly discusses on the concept of freedom in human beings. The fourth part is on his conception of obligation. In the fifth and last part there is a broad discussion on his Categorical Imperatives where Kant establishes certain underlining principles on morality.

The third chapter deals mainly with the criticism of Kant’s moral principles. It was an elaborate task for me to critically evaluate his philosophy, I tried mainly to analyze whether his ethical thoughts are still applicable in the present day society. This chapter consists of three parts; the first part deals with the criticism of Kant’s ethics in general in relation to the contemporary society, in the second part I tried to analyze his postulates of morality and the third part is the analysis of his Categorical Imperatives.

CHAPTER 1

LIFE AND WORKS OF IMMANUEL KANT

INTRODUCTION

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was an influential philosopher of the European Enlightenment. He eradicated the last traces of medieval worldview from modern philosophy, joined the key ideas of earlier rationalism and empiricism into a powerful model of the subjective origins of the fundamental principles of both science and morality, and laid the ground for much in the philosophy of 19th and 20th centuries. Above all, Kant was the philosopher of human autonomy, the view that by the use of our own reason in its broadest sense human beings can discover and live up to the basic principles of knowledge and action without outside assistance, above all without divine support or divine intervention.

Kant laid foundations of his theory of knowledge in his monumental Critique of Pure Reason (1781). He described the fundamental principle of morality in The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of morals (1785) and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). His influence on the development of science, theology, and philosophy is very valuable. He offered solutions to problems that have always had the utmost relevance for the thinker: such as, what are morality and duty? What are truth, beauty, and justice? What can and cannot be science? In doing so, he liberated science from religion and religion from known. He clarified the difference between knowledge and faith and established a branch of philosophy where he gave importance to empiricist and rationalist way of thinking.

This chapter consists of two parts. At first there is a short description about the life of Kant and in the second part the important works of Kant is discussed. In the first part his childhood, life as student and a professor; consequences which led to his critical thinking, the background of his thought etc. are discussed. In the second part there is a study of his tree Critiques – The Critique of Pure Reason, where he deals with the critical examination of reason in relation to sense experience; The Critique of Practical Reason, where the practical philosophy of Kant is presented and The Critique of Judgment, where the concepts like the beauty, sublime and good are discussed.

1.1 A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY

Immanuel Kant was born on 22 April 1724 in Konigsberg, the capital of East Prussia (today Kaliningrad, U.S.S.R.) as the fourth of nine children, of whom five--two younger sisters, an older sister, and a brother. His father, Johann Georg, was a harness maker. His mother, the former Anna Regina Reuter, was the daughter of a saddler, was born in Nuremberg. His parents were poor but devout followers of pietism, a Lutheran revival movement stressing love and good works, simplicity of worship, and individual access to God. He was educated at the local high school, the Collegium Fridericianum, there Kant spent eight years – six days a week, from seven in the morning until four in the afternoon-, studying Latin, Greek, Hebrew, French, Mathematics and Theology. In1740 at the age of sixteen Kant entered the University of Konigsberg, where he studied mathematics, physics, philosophy, theology and classical Latin literature. His leading teacher was Martin Knutenz (1713-51), who introduced him, to both Wolffian Philosophy and Newtonian physics, and who inspired some of Kant’s own later views and philosophical independence by his advocacy of physical influx against the pre-established harmony of Leibniz and Wolff.[5] Kant spent seven years in the University, but was not able to take a graduate. Due to financial hardship he had to leave the University, the death of his mother in1737 and death of his father in1746 also paved way for this. After leaving the University, in order to meet his financial needs Kant was employed for a few years as a tutor in a number of families in different parts of East Prussia.

In 1749 Kant published his first work Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces, it was an unsuccessful attempt to mediate between Cartesian and Leibnizian theories of physical forces. Kant then worked as a tutor, serving in households near Konigsberg for the next eight years. With the financial support of a friend, he returned to the University in 1755 and took a doctorate. In the same year he was given permission to teach at Konigsberg as a Privetodzent or Lecturer, a lowly position with prestige and no salary except for student fees. Circumstances forced him to live in a one- room apartment furnished only with a bed, a table and a chair. In order to supplement his meager income he worked as assistant librarian in the Royal Castle. In 1756 he tried to obtain Knutenz’s chair rendered vacant by the latter’s death. But Knutenz had been an extra ordinary professor and the government influenced by financial considerations, left the post unfulfilled.

In 1746 Kant was offered the chair of poetry, but he declined it wisely, to afford the post of professor. In 1769 he refused a similar offer from Jena. Finally in March 1770 at the age of forty-six he was appointed ordinary professor of logic and metaphysics at Konigsberg. His period as a Lecture lasted therefore from 1755 until 1770. He taught a wide variety of subjects, including Physics, Mathematics and Physical Geography as well as Philosophy. His lectures were salted with humor and even with stories. In his courses, his main aim was to stimulate his hearers to think for themselves, to stand on their own feet. Over the preceding years Kant has published a number of works, the majority on scientific cum-metaphysical subjects, which has earned him a secure reputation with Germany as a powerful, independent thinker. During these years he received offers from other universities but he refused in order to remain in his home city. He was such a person that any change in his physical environment, including the furniture, made him uneasy. The following Anecdote is important. In the 1780s he developed the habit of gazing out the window at a distant church steeple as he worked or meditated. After a few years trees growing in a neighbor’s garden obscured the steeple. He became restless and was unable to work. The problem was resolved when the neighbor, who admired the famous man, readily agreed to trim the offending trees. Kant refused to travel. He never saw a mountain or the sea, Although Baltic was only an hour away.

One can neither traces back the exact date of the starting of Kantian thinking or his rejection of Leibniz-Wolffian system of philosophy and beginning of working out his own system. He continued giving courses of lectures on subjects like anthropology and geography on the conviction that students need factual knowledge of this kind, in order that they might understand the part played by experience in our knowledge. The most influential areas of Kant’s thoughts were religious, political and scientific. It was because of the background of the Pietist tradition. Politically, Kant was a man of Enlightenment who spoke up for human rights, professed the equality of mankind, and advocated representative government. He was greatly influenced by French thinker Rousseau, who has raised questions on the social nature of morality and the problem of individual feeling. In science he studied the works of Sir Isaac Newton, which served as the basis for his lectures in physics and natural philosophy.

He published a number of books in his life time they are as follows: The Critique of Pure Reason was published in 1781. In 1783 he published Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, in 1785 the Fundamental Principles of Metaphysics of Morals, In 1786 the Metaphysical first principle of Natural Science, In 1787 The Second Edition of Metaphysics of Pure Reason, In 1788 the Critique of Practical Reason, In 1790 the Critique of Practical Judgment, In 1793 Religion within the bounds of Reason Alone, in 1795 a little treatise On Perpetual Peace, and in 1787 The Metaphysics of Morals.

Only once did Kant come into collision with political authority. This was connected with his Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone. In 1792 the second part of this work, titled On the Conflict of Good Principle Within the Evil, failed to pass the censorship, on the account that it attacked Biblical authority. However the whole works consisting of four parts, was approved by the faculty of Theology in Konigsberg and the Philosophical faculty of Jena and was published in 1793. In 1794 Frederick William II, expressed the displeasure at the book and accused Kant for misrepresenting and depreciating many fundamental principles of the scriptures and of Christianity. He promised the king to refrain from making public pronouncements, whether in writings or in lecturing on religion. However on the king’s death he was released from his promise and in 1798 he published The Conflict of the Faculties, where he discussed the relation between Theology in the sense of Biblical belief, and Philosophy or the critical reason.

The salient feature of Kant’s character was mainly his moral earnestness and his devotion to the idea of duty. He was a sociable man, who was so kind and benevolent. He was systematically careful in money matters and assisted a number of poor persons. He was not an orthodox Christian but he had a real belief in God. Kant died on February 12^th, 1804.

1.2 IMPORTANT WORKS

Kant’s philosophical writings can be classified into two periods, which before 1770, usually referred to as pre-critical, and after 1770, usually referred to as critical. The word critical comes from Kant’s own description of his philosophical forms of critical idealism, an idealism built on the basis of powers of reason alone. The summary of Kant’s three important critiques is being discussed here.

1.2.1 The Critique of Pure Reason

The Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant, (first published in 1781 and the second edition 1787) is one of the most influential works in the history of philosophy, also referred to as Kant's first critique. In the preface to the first edition Kant explains what he means by a critique of pure reason: "I mean by this a critique of, the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience." An explanation given to Kant’s Critique is that “Critique means a critical examination in two senses: a positive evaluation of reason as applied to sense experience, leading to a defense of mathematics and science against such skeptical attacks as Hume’s; and a negative evaluation of reason when it speculates beyond the limits of experience.” In thus second sense the Critique has strong doubts on the validity of classical metaphysics, and this was probably its most important contribution. Kant began the work with the promise to submit reason to a critique, in order to obtain a decision about the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics in general and the determination in its sources, its scope and its boundaries. The chief question would be “what and how much can understanding and reason know apart from all experience?”

The most important points in the Critique of Pure Reason are following:

The three main divisions are the Transcendental Aesthetic, Transcendental Analytic, and Transcendental Dialectic. Aesthetic is concerned with the power of sensibility, and with mathematics inclusive of geometry. In Transcendental Aesthetic Kant claims that “mathematics necessarily deals with space and time and claims that these are a priori forms of human sensibility that condition what is apprehended through the senses.” It also covers some of the fundamental pre-scientific propositions about space and time, e.g. regarding their number of dimension. The Analytic is concerned with the power of understanding, and with metaphysics of experience and natural science. In Transcendental Analytic he maintains that physics is a priori and synthetic because in its ordering of experience it uses concepts of a special sort. These concepts –categories, are a priori and opposed to empirical. The Dialectic is concerned with the power of reason and with transcendent metaphysics which divides into three bodies of doctrine: the metaphysics of soul (rational psychology), of the world as a whole (rational cosmology) and of God (rational theology).

Together the Aesthetic, Analytic and Dialectic fall under the heading Transcendental Doctrine of Elements because each deals with a different element of cognition; the Aesthetic with intuitions, the Analytic with concepts and the Dialectic with ideas. What we ordinarily refer to as intellect is split by Kant into two separate powers, understanding and reason.

The Transcendental Doctrine of Method gives the epistemological and metaphysical argument of the Critique with reflection on its methodology. It also contains a section called The Canon of Pure Reason, which contains important pointers to the rest of Kant’s Critical system. The clarity of the Critique can be seen more clearly in the conclusion of the work. The real division is between, on the one hand, the Aesthetic and Analytic, which are jointly concerned with knowable objects, on the other hand Dialectic is concerned with objects that cannot be known. The Aesthetic and Analytic are positive that; they prove that we can have knowledge of things which we can experience. The Aesthetic deals with sensible that is the spatio-temporal aspect of knowable objects, aesthetic argues that space and time are the necessary forms within which the mind the mind has sense experience. And therefore, mathematics concerned with the structure of space and time is a valid science. Analytic deals with the sensible and conceptual aspects, including the concepts of substance and causality. Jointly they express the metaphysics of experience. The Dialectic is negative; it seeks to prove that we cannot have knowledge of anything outside experience. It denies legitimacy to the other kind of metaphysics – transcendental metaphysics. When he reworked the Critique of Pure Reason in 1787, he added two more topics, they are – The Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics and The Metaphysical Elements of Natural Science.

1.2.2 The Critique of Practical Reason

The Critique of Practical Reason is the second of Immanuel Kant's three critiques, first published in 1788. It follows on from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and deals with his moral philosophy. The second Critique exercised a decisive influence over the subsequent development of the field of ethics and moral philosophy, beginning with Fichte's doctrine of Science and Becoming during the 20th century, the principal reference point for deontological moral philosophy. The first Critique was a critique of the pretensions of pure theoretical reason to attain metaphysical truths beyond the light of applied theoretical reason. The conclusion was that pure theoretical reason must be restrained, because it produces confused arguments when applied outside of its appropriate sphere. However, the Critique of Practical Reason is not a critique of pure practical reason, but rather a defense of it as being capable of grounding behavior superior to that grounded by desire-based practical reasoning. The second critique is far shorter and much less complicated. Here the human moral situation is clarified by reference to a notion of “holly will.”

Critique of Practical Reason contains definitive statements of his ethical theories. Kant’s major ethical doctrines are derived from the conception of Practical Reason itself- i.e. of rationality as capable of being a ground of action. He further explains man alone posses this capacity, the lower animal act from natural impulsions. Man also, since he is an animal, is moved by impulses and inclinations and naturally seeks the satisfaction of his own desires, but being rational, he finds himself subjected to a moral ought, to the command, so act that you can will, the maxim of your conduct to be a universal law. Kant calls this basic moral principle as Categorical Imperative. Since it is for each man, a dictate of his own rational nature and not imposed upon him, it represents the self-legislation or autonomy of the will. In contrast action which is not motivated merely by natural inclination represents a harmony of the will, a subordinate of the will to impulses and desires.

There is only one strict motive, the motive to act from respect for the moral law itself. Man inherits dignity and value and nothing can be substituted over it. This principle of value of human being is expressed in the second categorical imperative. “So act so always to treat the humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, always as an end withal, never as a means only.” Moral value or virtue is thus the supreme good. The only qualified good in the world is the good will. All men by nature deserve happiness and those who are virtues deserve it. The highest and complete good is the virtue. On the basis of these ethical doctrines, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant reinstates as belief what he refuses to recognize as demonstrable knowledge. We can’t avoid the moral command; hence we must accept what is essential to its validity. Such implications are freedom of will, immortality and existence of God. Man as an observable actuality is a natural phenomenon is explainable as the effect of natural cause. The validity of moral imperatives requires us to believe that man is also a transcendental being and free initiator of this moral conduct. Moral law commands a perfection of our will and purity of our motives, which are not naturally attainable. Since validity of this command requires possibility of its fulfillment, we must believe in a destiny beyond this natural life. We must be bound to act without regard to our own happiness, though happiness is the sum total of all that we desire, would not be a rational and valid command unless in the ultimate nature of things. There is some reconciliation between virtuous action and happiness thus which is thus deserved. Hence believe in God as a power which makes for righteousness is rationally impelled. Thus God, reason and immortality are valid as postulates of Practical Reason.

1.2.3 The Critique of Judgment

The Critique of Judgment is the third critique of Immanuel Kant, which published in 1790. It lays the foundations for modern aesthetics. It has two parts. The first part; The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment discusses the four possible reflective judgments; the agreeable, the beautiful, the sublime, and the good. In reflective judgment we seek to find unknown universals for given particulars. The second part The Critique of Teleological Judgment discusses way of judging things according to their ends (telos: Greek for end) is logically connected to the first discussion at least regarding beauty but suggests a kind of (self-) purposiveness (that is, meaningfulness known by one's self). The general topic of both parts is our imitation of purposivenes in things which cannot be scientifically and demonstrably ascribed to any purpose. Idealist philosophers consider this Critique as the capstone of his ethical philosophy. Empiricists regard it as an afterthought, which threatens the integrity of his system.

In the second part, on the discussion of the aesthetics, about the experience of the beauty he says, is a “disinterested and impersonal pleasure felt in the apprehension of the form of an object.” The aesthetic satisfaction arises when what is presented is not taken as the object of any specific purpose or desire or any specific theoretical concept, but so excites the play of the faculty as bring the imagination into the harmony with understanding. The felt harmony is formal purposiveness of it. When such contemplative pleasure is judged to be found up with the object, not only for the subject in question but for everyone the object is called beautiful. The explanation lies on the fact that, when a person contemplates on an object and finds it beautiful there is a certain harmony between his imagination and his understanding of which he is aware of what is happening in the object. The feeling of the sublime is due to the felt disparity between imagination and conception. When we dispassionately contemplate a thing which either in the magnitude or in its power is such that no image we can frame in adequate to the idea of it, we recognize the object as the sublime.

CONCLUSION

Immanuel Kant, one of the key figures in modern philosophy, is important not only for his critical approach in philosophy, but also for his method of synthesizing empiricist and rationalist way of thinking. It was he who introduced the new method of Copernican Revolution in the vast ocean of philosophy. The family background, education, areas of socialization and culture of society where one lives, are the elements which highly influence the character of an individual. While analyzing various philosophers, we come to know that behind the development of every philosopher, there was a vast horizon of experiences, concepts and thoughts upon which one could philosophize.

As an introductory chapter of my dissertation in this chapter I made an attempt to look into the life of Immanuel Kant. Kant had a background of strong family life in his childhood, but in his teenage he lost his parents and suffered a lot to continue his education. The hard experiences which he confronted in his early life might have touched him a lot. Beyond that his incomparable intelligence also has an important role behind the development of his thought. Thus the first part of this chapter was an attempt to understand the background of his philosophizing and to know the fact how the life situations of Kant helped him in developing his thinking structure.

In the second part of this chapter an attempt was made to look briefly into his important works such as The Critique of Pure reason, The Critique of Practical Reason and The Critique of Judgment respectively. I tried to study on his three main critiques because; these three critiques include the sum and substance of his philosophy. It helped me to understand the basic concepts and the Kantian style of philosophizing. The Critique of Pure Reason was a critical examination in two senses: a positive evaluation of reason as applied to sense experience, leading to a defense of mathematics and science against such skeptical attacks as Hume’s; and a negative evaluation of reason when it speculates beyond the limits of experience. The Critique of Practical Reason deals with his practical philosophy. It is far shorter and much less complicated. It is not a critique of the first critique, but rather a defense of it, as being capable of grounding behavior superior to that grounded by desire-based practical reasoning. Here the human moral situation is clarified by reference to a notion of holly will. The Critique of Judgment mainly deals with the concepts like, good, sublime etc. and lays foundation for modern aesthetics.

CHAPTER 2

KANTIAN ANTHROPOLOGY: HUMAN AS AN ETHICAL BEING

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally we consider human being as a rational animal. As we relate him with the society, we have to consider him not simply as a rational being but as a rational ethical being, because humans are beings of actions. They are the one who posses certain values in their life. Ethics is the reflective study of certain values that concern human beings. A sense of ethical values informs people’s lives, directly in deciding what to do, and in their comments and judgments on people and actions, including their own. People try, in many ways, to shape their lives by reference to such values: they think, even if not very explicitly, that some kind of life are more worth living than others, and try to bring up their children to share their outlook, or perhaps to develop another which equally they hope to be able to respect. Ethics tries to understand certain kinds of reasons for these actions of human beings.

Ethics deals with values, with good and bad, with right and wrong. What we do and what we don’t do is a subject of ethical thinking. Anyone who thinks about what he or she ought to do is, consciously or unconsciously, involved in ethics. One of the striking features of Kant’s anthropology is that, his morals or practical philosophy is developed not merely as a theoretical philosophy, but as a practical implication. Kantian philosophy, in a greater sense has proclaimed the dignity of human beings; mainly through the concept of freedom, autonomy, obligation and free will. This chapter is an attempt to look into the ethical concepts of Kant, in order to analyze how the concept of human being is developed in Kantian thinking and also to discover how he proved human as an ethical being through his moral principles.

This chapter consists of five parts. The first part discusses the autonomy and concept of free will in human beings. The second part is a brief discussion on his postulates of morality such as God, immortality and freedom, where he discusses the basic character of humans, as ethical beings. The third part mainly discusses on the concept of freedom in human beings. The fourth part is on his conception of obligation. The fifth and last part of this chapter discusses his Categorical Imperatives where Kant establishes certain underlining principles on morality.

2.1 HUMAN AS AN AUTONOMOUS BEING

While analyzing the historical reference of the concept – autonomy, we get the source from an early work Discourses (1531) by Machiavelli who combined the two senses of autonomy as the freedom from dependence and the power of self-legislate. Martin Luther in his work Freedom of A Christian (1520) has also mentioned about the political aspects of autonomy, which developed in the early modern city-state. He translated the concept of autonomy as freedom from dependence into the spiritual, new and inner, man’s freedom from the body and its inclinations as well as to obey the freedom of God’s Law. Kant’s account of autonomy in his practical philosophy in its turn marks a philosophical transposition and critique of Luther’s religious autonomy into moral autonomy.

At the heart of Kant's moral theory is the position that rational human wills are autonomous. Kant saw autonomy as important in understanding and justifying the authority moral requirements have over us. Kant’s practical philosophy combines the two aspects of autonomy within an account of the determination of the will. His position emerged from the critique of a number of then prevailing perspectives. As with Rousseau, whose views influenced Kant, freedom does not consist in being bound by no law, but by laws that are in some sense of one's own making. These thinking included his pre-critical opposition to the accounts of moral actions proposed by the dominant rational, perfectionist accounts moral actions proposed by the dominant rational, perfectionist account of the Wolffian school and the contemporary British theory of moral sense, pietist movements etc. he later identified that all these accounts are based on hetronomous principles and sought to develop a moral philosophy based on autonomous principle of self-legislation. The idea of freedom as autonomy thus goes beyond the merely negative sense of being free from influences on our conduct originating outside of ourselves. It contains first and foremost the idea of laws made and laid down by one and that have decisive authority over oneself.

Kant’s attribution of autonomy to every normal adult was a radical break with predominant views of moral capacity of ordinary people. The natural law theorists whose work was influential through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not fully concerned that the most people could know, everything that morally requires of them even without being told. The lawyers were admitted that God has given human the ability to know the basic principles of morality. But they held the view that many are not able to understand all the moral requirements implicit in the principles. They thought of morality as obligation imposed by law. For them, God is the legislator of moral law, and humans, his unruly subjects. Though most of the people are unwilling to obey the laws of nature, and must be made to do so through the treatment of punishment for noncompliance. A number of philosophers before Kant had begun to reject the natural lawyer’s law estimate of human moral capacity, and to present theories in which a greater amount of self governance is attributed to people.

Christian Wolf whose philosophy dominated German universities when Kant was a student argued that we can be self governed because we can see for ourselves what the consequences of our actions will be, and can tell which action can bring about the greatest amount of perfection. Since we are always drawn to act so as to bring about what we believe is the greatest amount of perfection, Wolf says we are bound to do what we think will be for the best and this seems to him to explain the necessity we call moral. In political matters we are obliged to act by sanctions imposed by a political ruler; but in morality we obliged ourselves to act through our perception of perfection. Hence in morality we are self governed. We need no sanctions to move us to act for the best.

For Kant this theory was not acceptable. He holds the view that Wolf’s thinking implied that the only necessity involved in morality is the necessity of using a means to an end to desire. If you do not want the end there is no need for you to do the acts that leads to it. Thus with the introduction of Kant’s ethical thought he made the concept of autonomy rather distinct from the early thinkers. He made the concept of autonomy independent from external forces.

At the centre of Kant’s ethical theory is the claim that normal adults are capable of being fully self - governing in moral matters. In Kant’s terminology, we are autonomous. Autonomy involves two components. The first is that no authority external to ourselves is needed to constitute or inform us of the demands of morality. We can each know without being told what we ought to do because moral requirements are requirements we impose on ourselves. The second is that in self-government we can effectively control ourselves. The obligation we impose upon ourselves override all other calls for action, and frequently run counter to our desires. We nonetheless have a sufficient motive to act as we ought. Hence no external source of motivation is needed for our self-legislation to be effective in controlling our behaviour.

Kant thinks that autonomy has basic social and political implications. It can be explained in relation to the parliamentary system of democracy; a state is free when its citizens are bound only by laws in some sense of their own making — created and put into effect, by vote or by elected representatives. Here the laws of that state express the will of the citizens who are bound by them. Then the source of legitimate political authority is not external to its citizens, but internal to them, internal to the will of the people. An autonomous state is thus one in which the authority of its laws is in the will of the people in that state. In similar way, we can say a person is free when he/she bounds only by his/her own will and not by the will of another. His/her actions then express not the will of someone or something else. The authority of the principles binding his/her will is then also not external to his/her will. So autonomy, when applied to an individual, ensures that the source of the authority of the principles that bind him/her is in his/her own will.

Kant always held the view that the moral need for our autonomy to express itself was compatible with certain kinds of social regulation. There is no place for others to tell us what morality requires, nor has anyone the authority to do so – not our neighbors, not the magistrates and their law, not even the religious persons. Because we are autonomous, each one of us must be allowed a social space within which we may freely determine our own actions. This freedom cannot be limited to the members of some privileged class. The structure of society must reflect and express the common and equal moral capacity of its members.

One of the important argument of Kant is his claim that a rational will can only act under the Idea of its own freedom. This argument cannot be misunderstood. In his most famous work the Critique of Pure Reason, he says, to argue that we have no rational basis for believing our wills to be free. This would involve, attributing a property to our wills that they would have to have as things in themselves apart from the causally determined world of appearances. According to Kant, there is no rational basis for the belief that the natural world is (or is not) arranged according to some purpose by a Designer, the actual practices of science often require looking for the purpose of this or that chemical, organ, creature, environment, and so on. Thus, one engages in these natural sciences by searching for purposes in nature. When an evolutionary biologist, looks for the purpose of some organ in some creature, may not all believe that the creature was designed by a Deity. Practicing biology involves searching for the purposes of the parts of living organisms. In the same way, although there is no rational justification for the belief that our wills are (or are not) free, the actual practice of practical deliberation and decision consists of a search for the right casual chain of which to be the origin — consists, that is, seeking to be the first causes of things, wholly and completely through the exercise of one's own will.

Kant’s interest in sociological and political implication of autonomy is shown in many places. In the short essay what is enlightenment? Kant argues each of us to refuse to remain under the tutelage of others. “I do not need to rely on a book which understands for me, a pastor who has a conscience of me.” But we must think and decide for ourselves. For this public freedom of discussion is necessary, particularly in connection with religion. Kant again says an enlightened ruler will allow such discussion to flourish, knowing that he has nothing to fear from it.

A society built around the virtues of generosity and kindness is for Kant a society requiring not only inequality but servility as well. If nothing is properly mine except what someone graciously gives me, I am forever dependent on how the donor feels toward me. My independence as an autonomous being is threatened. Only if I claim that the others have to give me what is mine by right can this be avoided. Kant did not deny the moral importance of beneficent action, but his theoretical emphasis on the importance of obligation or moral necessity reflects his rejection of benevolent paternalism and a servility that goes with it, just as the centrality of autonomy in his theory shows his aim of limiting political control of our lives. Thus for Kant autonomy is the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature.

2.1.1 Free Will

‘Free Will’ is a conventional name of a topic that is best discussed without reference to the will.Its central questions are what is it to act freely? And what is it to be morally responsible for one’s actions? Philosophers give very different answers to these questions. Kant in his ethical discussion discusses that (i) for a will to be free for it not to be subject to compulsion. (ii) But causality is affirmed of compulsion and the will is subject to it by virtue of our being a part of our natural order. (iii) What constitutes causal compulsion on the will is what Kant calls inclination, which has its source in our sensible nature (what Plato calls the body – the flesh in Christian literature). Our sensible nature is what makes us part of what Kant calls the phenomenal world where causality reigns supreme. (iv)We can be free by virtue of that aspect of ourselves which goes beyond or transcends that in us which partakes of the phenomenal world. This aspect is our reason and rationality.

Kant argues that the idea of an autonomous will emerges from a consideration of the idea of a will that is free. Rational will is the will that operates by responding to reasons. That is, the concept of a will is that which does not operate through the influence of factors outside of this responsiveness to reasons. For a will to be free it is to be physically and psychologically unforced in its operation. So, choices made because of obsessions or thought disorders are not free in this negative sense.But for Kant, a will that operates by being determined through the natural laws, like biology or psychology, cannot be thought of as operating by responding to reasons.

Natural world is subjected to laws of motion and to causality. Yet natural objects are free. The possibility of their acting has to do with human beings having a will. This involves primarily, the intelligibility of attributing intentional action to human beings and this in turn is bound up with acting for a reason. Having a will guarantees not freedom, but the possibility of this – the possibility of acting freely. This possibility is realized when a man’s will is his own, that is when it is not subordinate to anything external to it.

On Kant’s view there exists certain duality in man. They inevitably belong to nature or the phenomenal world, and they are also rational creatures and by virtue of this process the capacity to transcend what is natural in them. Like Plato, Kant here runs together two claims to be distinguished. (i) The first one is that the possibility of reaction, such as human beings are capable of, involves the capacity to act for a reason. Human beings are different from all other creatures in possessing this capacity. Human beings acts freely when his will is autonomous and that means when it is determined by reason. (ii) The second claim relates to a timeless world in identity with which alone real freedom to be achieved.

Kant represents the conflict as between man’s appetitive nature which has to do with the sense of sensuality (Kant refers to it as inclination) and reason or man’s rationality. The word inclination covers many different things as it is normally used, that means to act in accordance with one’s impulses. As for human beings belonging to the natural world by the virtue of their inclinations, is simply used here to signify man’s appetitive nature. Kant along with many other philosophers agree that a man whose actions are random is not charge of what he does and so is not responsible for his actions. Such a man far from being free is really subject to the moment. The will when it is free is not lawless. Regularity may be essential to human free will; he recognizes that the kind of regularity in question is not causal regularity. Kant points out that the sense in which considerations of reason govern the will is different from the sense which laws of nature govern natural phenomena: according to Kant, only a rational being has the power to act in accordance with the idea of laws – that is in accordance with principles- and only so has he a will.

2.2 Postulates of Morality

Kant proposes three postulates in his ethical theory namely freedom, God and Immortality taking into account the fact that man is not purely a rational being but a creature haunted by inclinations. The three postulates are not theoretical dogmas but are presuppositions having necessary practical reference. God as postulate by Kant is not the God of religion. The postulate of God has origin in one’s own reason which would necessarily mean that submitting to will of God is submitting to one’s own reason. The concept of God arises because the relationship between moral law and happiness is not guaranteed in this world. So here God comes to the rescue and thus necessitates the compatibility of virtue and realization of highest good. The postulate of immortality is very much interwoven with the postulate of God. Taking into account the sensuous nature of human beings, Kant states that it is very difficult for a man to be righteous without hope. Immortality guarantees this hope and ensures that there is a place sufficient for the reckoning of happiness in proportion to worthiness to be happy. The postulate of freedom has a special position among the other two postulates. Freedom is an a priori that we may not understand but we know it as the condition of the moral law which we may know. It is because of freedom that God and Immortality gain objective reality and legitimacy and subjective necessity. Then freedom can be considered as the keystone of the structure of pure reason.

According to Kant, a postulate is “a theoretical propositions which is not as such demonstrable but which is an inseparable corollary of an a priori unconditionally valid practical law.” So the postulate becomes part of the Kant’s ethical structure but he makes it clear that the postulates have no theoretical role. Though we have no intuitions to apply the concepts of freedom, God and immortality; no theoretical knowledge is possible. As Kant makes it clear, “A postulate of practical reason is an object of rational belief, but the reasons for the belief are practical and moral. The person needs the belief as a condition for obedience to the moral law and it is this combined with the categorical nature of that law which justifies the belief. Although the beliefs are theoretical in form- will is free, there is God-their basis and their functions are practical.

The postulates are indemonstrable and are necessary for practical function. A postulate in general sense means to suggest or accept that something is true so that it can be used the basis of a theory. A postulate of pure practical reason is a factual proposition which combines the two following characteristics: (i) there is no convincing factual evidence for or against it. (ii) Unless a person accepts it, he finds himself in the practical dilemma of knowing himself to be under an unconditional obligation to strive to bring about a certain state of affairs is in principle unrealizable.So the postulates are not theoretical dogmas but presuppositions having a necessary practical reference, which do not extend speculative cognition but give objective reality to the idea of speculative reason in general.

The postulates do not give us knowledge of their objects instead they enable us to assert their reality. “when these ideas of God, of an intelligible world and of immortality are predicates which are taken from our own nature, we must regard this determination neither as a sensualising of these pure ideas nor as a transcendent knowledge of supersensible objects; for the predicates we use are only understanding and will, and, indeed, these regarded only in that relation to each other in which we are required by the moral law to regard them.” It is only from the practical point of view that we have the postulates and it will be foolish to go behind the practical postulates in search of theoretical proof. Now let us discuss the three postulates of morality by Immanuel Kant.

2.2.1 The Postulate of God

While discussing about the postulate of God, Kant says that, the postulate of God is based on the moral proof rather than the theoretical proof. Kant criticizes the attempts to employ reason to theology and giving out theoretical proofs and dogmas of things in phenomenal world which the reason of human beings is unable to reach. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant writes, “All attempts to employ reason in theology in any way merely speculative manner are altogether fruitless and by their very nature null and void…the only theology of reason which is possible is that which is based upon moral laws” Kant again asserts that the idea of God should originate in our own reason and as mentioned earlier the God postulated by Kant is not the God of religion but that which origin in one’s own reason.

Why do the postulates of God come into picture? Kant says, “This system of self-rewarding morality is only an idea, the realization of which rests on the condition that everyone does what he should. But his is no reason for anyone for not being moral. Kant would say that when we have a good reason to believe, that we can get to the goal which we follow. But in the natural world the goal imposed by morality is not always realized. The relationship between happiness and moral law is not guaranteed although. Kant again says, “To be happy is necessarily the desire of every rational finite being, and thus it is an unavoidable finite being, and thus it is an unavoidable determinant of its faculty of desire.” If this was guaranteed then we would not have seen people who lack good will enjoying un-interrupted prosperity and morally good people should experience general happiness to the exact proportion to their moral goodness. So we must therefore postulate as it were unnatural world, beyond the temporal frame of ordinary existence and ruled by a wise benevolent and powerful God, in which the ideal results of morality will become actual. In particular, God turns out to be the highest original good. From whom the highest derived good, the happiness of all as a result of morality of all is derived.

The assumption of the existence of God can never be made the basis of our obligation to obey the moral law. It is in fact a moral necessity to assume the existence of God. The postulate of God is a need or requirement of our moral consciousness or a moral necessity which is subjective and not objective which means that it is not itself a duty. It is in no way connected to the consciousness of our duty. The divine will is the motive to action, not ground of it.

Kant stresses that the properties of Omnipotence, Omniscience and Omnipresence can be assigned to God to play his moral role of guaranteeing the possibility of the highest good and that have no basis for assigning any other properties to God. God is not a metaphysical concept, original being, first cause not blindly working eternal root of all things. It functions in the thinking of a moral agent and exercise a real influence on human actions.

2.2.2 The postulate of Immortality

The postulate of God has a close affinity to the postulate of Immortality in the realization of the moral Ideal. As Kant states in his critique, “the belief in God and another world is so interwoven with my moral sentiment.” The postulate of immortality was taken seriously by Kant even when he was traditionalistic in his rationalism. The premise of immortality was found in the incomplete harmony between morality and its consequences in the world. He was of the view that the belief in immortality has to be based on the moral disposition and not one hope of future rewards.

In Critique of Practical Reason, Kant says that the belief in immortality is based on a notable characteristic of our nature, never to be capable of being satisfied by what is temporal. Basing himself on the principle of purposiveness, Kant bases his first argument for immortality. As nothing is purposeless each organ or faculty into the world has its own specific claim that human life as whole must have its own end, although it is an end not in this life but in a future life.

Kant gives the moral arguments instead of the theoretical arguments for the immortality of the soul:

1. The highest good is a necessary object of the will.

2. Holiness, or complete fitness of intentions to the moral law, is necessary condition of the highest good.

3. Holiness cannot be found in a sensuous rational being. It can be reached only in an endless progress and since holiness is required, such endless progress toward it is the true object of the will such progress can be endless only if the personality of the rational being endures endlessly.

4. The highest good can be made real, only on “the supposition of the immortality of the soul.

There arises a problem if we look out for unknown happiness in the unknown world because, it would go against the self rewarding morality proposed by Kant and it leads to the failure of achieving happiness in the natural lives. So in the second critique Kant would argue that we need immortality, not to achieve happiness not at all but rather in order to make endless progress toward the complete conformity of dispositions with the moral law, that is, toward virtue or worthiness to be happy.

Kant gives another proof for the existence of God. The postulates of God and immortality compute the happiness in proposition to worthiness to be happy ensuring that here is a power and a place for the fulfillment of the proof for existence of God. Kant also makes it clear that the postulate of immortality is that which cannot be known but can only be thought. Kant also claims that his arguments for immortality do not provide us with any theoretical laws but only practical and objective truth that can give rise to actions based on motives, and, above all, sustain a moral agent in the moral nature involved in making human worthy of highest good.

2.2.3 The Postulate of Freedom

Kant gives an important placer for freedom in his postulates of morality. Freedom is considered as logically possible and practically useful concept in the Critique of Pure Reason. The special statues given to freedom can be being readout from the Critique of Practical Reason: Freedom, however among all the ideas of speculative reason is the only possibility we know a priori. We do not understand it, but we know it as the condition of the moral law which we know. The ideas of God and immortality are, on the contrary, not conditions of the moral law, but only conditions of the necessary object of a will which is determined by this law, this will being morally the practical use of our pure reason. He also asserts that freedom is “the key stone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even speculative reason.”

Freedom in its positive conception should not be given a theoretical employment. The role of idea of freedoms and the intelligible world is, practical. It provides an idea of ourselves which motives us to obey the moral law. It is impossible to give empirical or theoretical evidence for freedom. Kant says that, “It is therefore moral law, of which we become immediately conscious can soon as we draw up maxims of the will of ourselves that offers itself to us and lead directly to the concept of freedom.” Kant also gives a theoretical proof of the reality of our freedom he held the view that we could infer the reality of our freedom from the consciousness by means of the principle that ought implies can.

Kant’s thought on freedom of the will can be asserted through five phases. It is as follows:

· Kant asserts that free human actions are those that have internal rather than external causes.

· We cannot prove the existence of free human actions which are not dictated by deterministic laws of nature.

· It is possible to prove the existence of human freedom and thereby also prove that moral law applies to us.

· We can prove the freedom of our will form the indisputable fact of our religion.

· The existence of free will simply implies the in escapable possibility of human evil but equally the concomitantly indestructible possibility of human conversions to goodness.

According to Kant the ideas of God and immortality gain objective reality and legitimacy and in subjective necessity freedom is given fundamental importance. As Kant states in Critique of Practical Reason: The concept of freedom, in so far as its reality is proved by an apodictic law of practical reason, is the key stone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even of speculative reason. All other concepts (like God and Immortality), which are mere ideas, are unsupported by anything in speculative reason are now attached themselves to the concept of freedom and gain, with stability and objective reality. That is, their possibility is proved by the fact that really there is freedom, and this idea is revealed by moral law. Though freedom is given a special status, it does not mean that it is totally different from other postulates. As we are neither in a position to prove their reality by speculative reason nor to refute them, pre supposing that all three postulates are a need of pure practical reason, which is based on duty to make the highest good the object of the will.

2.3 CONCEPT OF FREEDOM

Freedom is a pivotal condition of Kantian philosophy, including both its theoretical and practical sections. One of the important quotes of Kant about freedom is that “Freedom is independence of the compulsory will of another, and in so far as it tends to exist with the freedom of all according to a universal law, it is the one sole original inborn right belonging to every man in virtue of his humanity”. Freedom has two important qualities, which were first described by the early modern conception of freedom developed by Machiavelli: freedom involves both independence from any form of dependency – freedom from and the power for a subject to legislate for itself – freedom to.

The most important belief about noumena is that Kant thinks only practical philosophy can justify concerns about human freedom. On Kant’s view Freedom is important because moral judgment presupposes that we are free in the sense that we have the ability to do otherwise. To understand this, Kant gives an example of a man who commits a theft. Basing on this example, Kant holds that in order for this man's action to be morally wrong, it must have been within his control in the sense that it was within his power at the moment not to have committed the theft. If this was not within his control at the moment, then, while it may be useful to punish him in order to shape his behavior or to influence others, it nevertheless would not be correct to say that his action was morally wrong. Moral rightness and wrongness apply only to free agents who control their actions and have it in their power, at the time of their actions, either to act rightly or not. According to Kant, this is just common sense.

Kant rejects the compatibilism of Leibniz. On the compatibilist view, as Kant understands it, I am free whenever the cause of my action is within me. So I am not free only when something external to me pushes or moves me, but I am free whenever the proximate cause of my body's movement is internal to me as an acting being. The reason is ultimately that the causes of these movements occur in time. As in the case of theft example, the compatibilist would say that the thief's action is free because its proximate cause is inside him, and because the theft was not an involuntary convulsion but a voluntary action. The thief decided to commit the theft, and his action flowed from this decision. According to Kant, however, if the thief's decision is a natural phenomenon that occurs in time, then it must be the effect of some cause that occurred in a previous time.

According to Kantian thought, even if the cause of my action is internal to me, if it is in the past — for example, if my action today is determined by a decision I made yesterday, or from the character I developed in childhood — then it is not within my control now. The matter is not whether the cause of my action is internal or external to me, but whether it is in my control now. For Kant, however, the cause of my action can be within my control only if it is not in time. Here comes the importance of transcendental idealism, which is the only way to make sense of the kind of freedom that morality requires. For transcendental idealism allows that the cause of my action may be a thing in itself outside of time: namely, my noumenal self, which is free because it is not part of nature. No matter what kind of character I have developed or what external influences act on me, on Kant's view all of my intentional, voluntary actions are immediate effects of my noumenal self, which is causally undetermined. My noumenal self is an uncaused cause outside of time, which therefore is not subject to the deterministic laws of nature in accordance with which our understanding constructs experience.

Kant calls upon the transcendental idealism to make a sense of freedom. According to Kant, if morality requires that I am transcendentally free, then it seems that my true self, and not just an aspect of my self, must be outside of time. If only my noumenal self is free, and freedom is required for moral responsibility, then my phenomenal self is not morally responsible.

In Critique of Pure reason, Kant introduces the concept of spontaneity as the theoretical analogue of freedom; here he also refers to cosmological and practical sense of freedom. By the former he understands the power of bringing a state spontaneously and describes it as reason creating for itself the idea of a spontaneity which can bring to act itself, without requiring to be determined to action by an antecedent cause in accordance with law and causality. This spontaneity is thus opposed to natural causes, and has the ground for its determination within itself. This spontaneity is described as one of the source of knowledge along with receptivity. He opposes the spontaneity of imagination and understanding to the receptivity of the sensibility. Spontaneity is the power of producing representation from itself; but it is a power incapable of producing knowledge without the contribution of receptivity. For the spontaneous act of synthesis to take place there has to be something present in sensibility to be synthesized.

In Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals freedom is defined negatively and positively. At first, “The will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far as they are rational; freedom would be the possibility of this causality that makes it effective independent of any determination by alien causes” in the second, freedom consists in the self legislation, “what else then, can freedom of will be but autonomy, i.e. the property that the will has of being a law unto itself?”

The imperative appropriate for such a conception of freedom can be neither hypothetical nor material; but are categorical and formal. They are “not concerned with the matter of action and its intended result, but rather with the form of the action and the principle from which it follows.”Yet these actions have to be effective in a world of space and time overwhelmed by competing and incompatible material ends. If the imperative had no application in this world then it would be empty like the pure spontaneity of the understanding. The outcome was a bifocal moral philosophy: at its most ambitious but ill-focused extreme, autonomy in the core of a metaphysically grounded account of freedom. But at the other extreme it is but the modest basis of a canonical principle for testing maxims of action.

2.4 CONCEPT OF OBLIGATION

What stands out in Kant’s morality through which we govern ourselves is that there are some actions we simply have to do. We impose a moral law on ourselves, and the law gives rise to obligation, to a necessity to act in a certain ways. For Kant, morality is not something which rises from a virtuous disposition that forces us to help others. He sees always it as a struggle.

As mentioned earlier, the contemporary lawyers of Kant held the view that punishment is necessary in order to make others obey the natural laws. This view was built into the concept of obligation. They held that obligation could only be explained as necessity imposed by a law backed by threats of punishment for disobedience. So they thought Kant’s view, that we can make and motive ourselves to obey the moral law is mere foolishness. In opposition to this view, the British philosophers Shaftsbury and Hutcheson described virtue rather than law and obligation as central to morality. They argued that to be virtuous we have only to act regularly and deliberately from benevolent motives that we naturally approve. Because approval is naturally felt by everyone, and because we have benevolent motives, we can all equally see and do what morality calls for, without need of external guidance or of sanctions. Christian Wolff, a contemporary of Kant, tried to reach a similar conclusion by a similar route.

Kant came to hold that neither of these kinds of moral theory was acceptable. They imply that the only necessity involved in morality is the necessity of using a means to end your desire. If you do not want the end, there is no need for you to do the act that leads to it. But Kant thinks that it is just a contingent empirical fact that you have the desire you have. If so, then on these views it is a matter of coincidence whether or not someone is bound by any moral necessity. Thus obligation becomes a matter of what one wants to do.

2.5 CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES

The Categorical Imperative is the central philosophical concept in the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, introduced in Kant's Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals. It may be defined as a way of evaluating motivations for action. It is very difficult to interpret this work, but it is filled with depth of insight and has a quality to make impact on the reader. Kant says that the sole aim of his book is to seek out and establish the supreme principle of morality. While defining an imperative, Kant makes distinction between command and imperative. “The conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is necessitating for a will, is called a command and the formula of the command is called an imperative.” According to Kant, human beings occupy a special place in creation, and morality can be summed up in one ultimate commandment of reason, or imperative, from which all duties and obligations derive. He defined an imperative as any proposition that declares a certain action (or inaction) to be necessary.

There are three kinds of imperatives, corresponding to three different kinds or sense of good action. Only one of these imperative is said to be moral imperative. The following sentence is an example for imperative, if you wish to learn French; you ought to take these means. Here there are two things to notice; first, the actions commanded are conceived as being good with a view to attaining an end. They are not the actions which ought to be performed for their own sake, but only as a means. The imperative is thus to be called hypothetical. Secondly, the end here is not one which everyone seeks by nature. A man may wish or not wish to learn French. The imperative means that if you wish to learn French, you ought to take certain means that is performing certain actions. This type of imperative is called by Kant a problematic Hypothetical imperative. This type of imperative is not a moral imperative. The actions commanded are commanded simply as useful for the attainment of an end which one may or may not desire to attain; and the pursuit may or may not be compatible with moral law. Hypothetical imperatives are an action based on desire. It is a directive to the effect that if you wish to achieve such and such an end, you must act in such and such way. Thus they are concerned with prudential actions. It is also a command of reason. An example is that; be honest so that people may think good of you.

Kant doesn’t consider Hypothetical imperative as moral imperative. He is somewhat cavalier in his treatment of teleological ethical theories. He doesn’t seem to give sufficient consideration to a distinction which has to be made between different types of teleological ethics. Kant expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the popular moral philosophy of his day, believing that it could never surpass the level of hypothetical imperatives; which tell us the means we could achieve our ends. They do not tell us about ends we should choose. If a utilitarian says that murder is wrong because it does not maximize good for those who involved, this is irrelevant to people who are concerned only with maximizing the positive outcome for themselves. Consequently, Kant argued, hypothetical moral systems cannot convince moral action or be regarded as bases for moral judgments against others, because the imperatives on which they are based rely too heavily on subjective considerations. Happiness may be considers as a subjective state which is acquired by certain actions but which is distinct from these actions. In this case the actions are judged good simply as means to an end to which they are external. But ‘happiness’ if we follow, for instance, the customary way of translating Aristotle’s eudaimonia, may be regarded as an objective actualization of the potentialities of man as man, and these actions are not purely external to the end. Kant presented a moral system, based on the demands of the categorical imperative, as an alternative. Kant rejects all Hypothetical imperatives, from moral imperatives. He says that moral imperatives must be Categorical. Categorical imperative is purely a priori, by considering the mere concept of a categorical imperative; it commands conformity to law in general.

A categorical imperative denotes an absolute, unconditional requirement that asserts its authority in all circumstances, both required and justified as an end in itself. By identifying a good will as the only unconditional good, he denies that the principle of good willing can be fixed by reference to an objective good or telos at which they aim. Rather than assuming a determinate account of the good, and using this as the basis for determining what we ought to do, he uses an account of the principles of ethics to determine what is to have a good will. He asks one question: what maxims or fundamental principles could be adopted by a plurality of agents without assuming anything specific about the agent’s desire or their social relations? He further adds principles that cannot be served for a plurality of agents have to be rejected: the thought is that nothing could be a moral principle which cannot be a principle for all. Morality begins with the rejection of non-universalizable principles. The idea is formulated as a demand, and calls it Categorical Imperative.

2.5.1 The First Formulation

The first formulation of Categorical Imperative which is also known as the Formula of Universal Law’ stated as follows: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.” This is the important formulation in Kant’s ethics. The indication of first formulation is this: an agent who adopts a maxim of promising falsely could not will it as a universal law. If the person where to do so he would be committed to the predictable result that that trust would break down so that he could act on his initial maxim of promising falsely. The formulation states that a maxim of false formulation is not universalizable hence cannot be included among the shared of any plurality of beings. The maxim of rejecting of false promising is morally required; the maxim of promising falsely morally forbidden. It is important to note that, Kant doesn’t think false promising wrong because of its presumed unpleasant effects but it cannot be willed as a universal principle.

Kant distinguishes two modes of ethical assessment. At first we might evaluate the maxims that agents adopt. By discerning this we will be able to pick out those who reject non-universalizable principles (so have morally worthy principles) and those who adopt non-universalizable principles (so have morally unworthy principles). Kant speaks of those who hold morally worthy principles as acting out of duty. However, Kant holds that we do not have certain knowledge either of our own or of others’ maxims. We normally infer agents’ maxim or underlying principles from the pattern of their action, yet no pattern will pick out a unique maxim. For example, the activity of a genuinely honest shop keeper may not differ from that of the reluctantly honest shopkeeper, who deals fairly only out of desire for a good business reputation and would cheat if a safe opportunity arouse. Hence for ordinary purposes we can often do no more than concern ourselves with outward conformity to maxims of duty, rather than with claims that an act was done out of such a maxim. Kant also speaks of an action that would have to be done by anyone who has a morally worthy maxim as actions in accordance with duty. Such action is obligatory and its omission forbidden.

2.5.2 The Second Formulation

The second formulation of Categorical Imperative which is also known as the formula of end in itself, is: “act so as to treat man, in your own person as well as in that of anyone else, always as an end, never merely as a means.” It demands that we treat humanity in our own person or in the person of any other never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end. It is the highly articulated version of a demand for respect for persons. Instead of demanding that we check that all could adopt the same maxims, it demands less directly that we act in ways that respect, so leave intact, others’ capacities to act.

The first indication of the formulation is that, at first, one who thinks about suicide will ask himself whether his action is consistent with the idea of man as an end in itself. If he destroys himself to escape oppressive conditions, he uses a person merely as a means to maintain a tolerable condition until life ends. But man is not a thing, something which is to be used merely as means, but all his actions must always be considered as an end in itself. So, I cannot dispose man in any way to man in my own person so as to mutilate, damage or kill him.

The second indication is that, regarding obligatory duty towards others, whoever is thinking of making a lying promise to others will see at once that he would be using another man merely as a means, without the latter being the end in itself. The person whom I propose to use by such a promise of my own purposes cannot possibly assent to my way of acting toward him/her. This conflict with the principle of duty towards others becomes more obvious if we consider examples of attacks on the liberty and property of others. Here it is clear that whoever transgresses the rights of men/women intends to use the person of others merely as means without considering that as rational beings they shall always be regarded as end also; that is, as beings who could possibly be the end of very same action.

Kant interprets of the moral failure of not treating others as ends as an alternative basis for an account of the virtues. To treat others who are specifically human in their finitude – hence vulnerable and needy – as ends requires that we support one another’s capacities to act, to adopt maxims and to pursue their particular ends. Hence it requires at least some support for others’ project and purposes. Kant holds that this requires at least a limited beneficence. Although he does not establish an unrestricted obligation of beneficence, such as utilitarians hold to, he does argue for an obligation to reject a policy of refusing needed help. Failure to treat others or oneself as ends is once again seen as a failure of virtue or imperfect obligation. Imperfect obligations cannot prescribe universal performance: we can neither help all in need, nor develop all possible talents. We can however, refuse to make indifferent of either sort basic of our lives – and may find that rejecting principled indifference demands a lot. Even a commitment of this nature, taken seriously, will demand much. If we honor it, we have on Kant’s account shown respect for persons and specifically for human dignity.

2.5.3 The Third Formulation

The third formulation of Categorical imperative which is also known as the Formula of Autonomy is “Therefore every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxim always a legislative member in the universal kingdom of ends.” The idea of rational beings as ends in themselves, which is united with that of rational will or practical reason as morally legislating, bring us to the concept of ends. Kant says that I understand by a kingdom the systematic union of rational beings through common laws. And because these laws have in view the relation of these beings to one another as ends and means, as Kant puts it, it can be called a kingdom of ends. A rational being can belong to this kingdom in either of two ways. He belongs to it as a member when he is subjected to given laws. He belongs to it as a sovereign or supreme head when, while legislating he is not subject to the will of any other. Every rational being is both member and sovereign; for no rational being is, when legislating and as legislating, subject to the will of another. It is possible to take supreme head as referring to God. For Kant rational being can occupy the place of supreme head only if he is a completely independent being without want and without limitation.

CONCLUSION

Morality is highly related with human being. As human being is the part of the society, he/she is more inclined to moral values. Kant’s moral thought stress on the importance of man as a rational being. His philosophy is highly influential in considering the dignity of human person. It is the moral principles that create the sense of human and social values in society. Moral principles help not only to lead a harmonious life, but also to create a sense of freedom and justice in the society. It is the moral principles which create in man a sense of human dignity and a sense of rational free will. The second formulation of categorical imperative is a best example for this in which it exhorts man should not be considered as merely a means but as an end. As I finished the second chapter I understood one thing that Kant gives predominant importance to human person’ especially in the concepts of his autonomy, free will etc.

Kant’s morals or practical philosophy is developed not merely as a theoretical philosophy, but as a practical implication. Kantian philosophy, in a greater sense has proclaimed the dignity of human beings; mainly through the concept of freedom, autonomy, obligation and free will. This chapter was an enquiry into the analysis of how the concept of human being is developed in Kantian thinking and also to discover how he proved human as an ethical being through his moral principles.

This chapter was mainly dealing with Kantian concept of autonomy and concept of free will which was helpful in showing the dignity of mankind. The discussion on his ‘postulates of morality’ such as God, immortality and freedom, analyzes the basic character of humans, as ethical beings. Through God, he shows the end of humans’ moral actions. The third part mainly discussed on the concept of freedom in human beings. The fourth part was on his conception of obligation. The fifth and last part of this chapter discussed his categorical Imperatives where Kant establishes certain underlining principles on morality.

CHAPTER 3

CRITICISM OF KANT’S THINKING

INTRODUCTION

I found it difficult to look with a critical mind into the ethical thought of such a great philosopher Immanuel Kant, because his ethical thought is perhaps both the finest and the most characteristic product of the Enlightenment period. We know that Kant’s thoughts have the background of Rationalist and Empirical ways of thinking. He aimed to resolve disputes between empirical and rationalistic approaches. The former asserted that all knowledge comes through experience; the latter maintained that reason and innate ideas were prior. But Kant argued that experience is purely subjective without first being processed by pure reason. He added that, using reason without applying it to experience, only leads to theoretical illusions. Thus a philosophy of unifying the two divergent thinking in modern era was a commendable step of Kant and it was a new epoch in the modern thinking. The free and proper exercise of reason by the individual was a theme of Kant's approaches to the various problems of philosophy. An attempt to criticize it is both a theoretical exercise and a part of an ongoing praxis that aims at supporting, opposing or transforming the movement itself.

While looking into the ethical thoughts of Kant, we come to know that his thoughts are marked by an unswerving commitment to human freedom, the dignity of man and to the view that moral obligation derives neither from God, nor from human authorities and communities, nor from the preferences or desires of human agents, but from reason. I think, while analyzing Kant’s ethics we have to look deep into his early parts of writings. Secondly, the developments added in his ethics by the thinkers after the Kantian era. Finally, we have to keep in mind that Kant’s ethics is used as an admiring label even today in the contemporary ethical positions.

A philosophical position is said to be relevant if and only if it has still influence in the changing patterns of the society. It is sure that every thinking pattern has a positive and negative impact in the society. Thus while criticizing Kant’s ethics; I thought to analyze his ethics in relation with the contemporary thinking patterns. For that purpose, this chapter is divided into three parts; the first part deals with the criticism of Kant’s ethics in general in relation to the contemporary society, in the second part I tried to analyze his postulates of morality and the third part is the analysis of his Categorical Imperatives.

3.1 CRITICISM OF KANT’S ETHICS IN GENERAL

The general criticisms on Kant’s ethics are scientifically explained by experts in certain terms. Such general criticisms are discussed in the following lines.

3.1.1 Rigorism

This is the claim that Kant’s ethics leads to rigidly insensitive rules, and so cannot take account of differences between cases. However, universal principles need not command uniform treatment; indeed they may command differentiated treatment. Principles such as taxation should be proportionate to ability to pay or the punishment must fit the crime are universal statements but demand differentiated treatment. Even principles that do not specifically command differentiated treatment will be indeterminate.

3.1.2 Abstraction

Those who admit that Kant’s arguments identify some principles of duty, but do not impose rigid uniformity, often move on with the claim of the criticism of formalism. They will say that Kant identifies ethical principles, but these principles are too abstract to guide action, because his theory is not action – guiding. Kant’s principles of duty are abstract, and he does not provide a detailed set of instructions for following them.

3.1.3 Conflicting grounds of Obligation

This criticism points out that Kantian ethics identifies a set of principles which may come into conflict. This criticism is true of Kant’s ethics. Since trade-offs between differing obligations are not part of the theory, there is no routine procedure for dealing with conflicts. On the other hand, since the theory is only a set of slide constrain on action, the central demand is to find some actions that falls within all constrains. Only when no such actions can be found, the problem of multiple grounds of obligation made by advocates of virtue ethics has unavoidably to be violated or neglected, as appropriate.

3.1.4 Place of Inclinations

A group of serious criticism of Kant’s moral psychology occurs throughout the secondary literature. In particular it is said that Kant’s requires that we act out of the motive of duty, hence not out of inclinations, and so is driven to the claim that action which we enjoy cannot be morally worthy. This grim interpretation, perhaps first suggested by Schiller, involves a tangle of difficult issues. By acting out of the motive of duty, Kant means only we act on a maxim of duty and so experience a feeling of reverence for the law. This reverence is a response to and not the source of moral worth. It is compatible with action being in line with our natural inclinations and so enjoyed. On the view the clear conflict between duty and inclination is only epistemological; we can know that we act out of duty only if inclinations is lacking. On other views, the issue run deeper, and leads to a more serious charge that Kant cannot account for wrongdoing.

3.1.5 No Account of Wrongdoing

This criticism is that Kant can allow only for free action which is fully autonomous – i.e. done on a principle that meets the limit that all others can do likewise – and for action which reflects only natural desires and inclinations. Hence we cannot allow for free, imputable but wrong action. Clearly Kant thinks that he can give an account of wrongdoing, for he frequently gives examples of imputable wrongdoing. This criticism probably reflects a failure to keep separate the claim that free agents must be capable of acting autonomously with the claim that free agents always act autonomously. Imputability requires the capacity to act autonomously but this capacity may not always be exercised. Wrongful acts are indeed not autonomous, but they are chosen rather than inflicted mechanically by our desires or inclinations.

3.2 CRITICISM OF KANT’S POSTULATES OF MORALITY

Kant’s structure has strong foundation in rationality, but this rationality alone could not be used to give fullness and perfection to his theory. He incorporated the postulates of God, Immortality and freedom as an attempt to limit the theoretical and to extend the practical usefulness. While analyzing the postulates we become skeptical of Kant’s philosophical structure built on rationality and it evokes a question in our mind whether it is a last minute attempt by Kant to save his thinking structure. Regarding the mentioning of postulates, Kant has received criticism from many sides. One such Criticism is by Neiman, following Hegel he holds that, “Kant’s postulates of reason are pitiful substitutes for the truth that it failed to establish.” Another criticism arising from incorporating postulates is that, postulates become meaningful only to a person who is moral and for a person who turns a blind eye towards it becomes impossible to objectively identify the reality of God, freedom and immortality. “If there were to be someone who was genuinely deaf to the call of moral obligation or totally indifferent to the question whether the world could be made better or not, he could not even understand what the proof was about.” That is, if the postulates are taken of their practical context then they may not become that much useful. Kant’s denial of theoretical knowledge to bring in the practical postulates does not satisfactorily formulate the intrinsic connection which Kant is trying to establish between morality and metaphysics. The postulates, brought in to the critical philosophy not because of their metaphysical existence and epistemological knowledge but by their transcendental (practical) reality are crucial for human life as it give a moral certitude by which we can respond to the demands of moral law.

Kantian notion of the Postulate of God is said to have a pragmatic approach. As mentioned in the second chapter Kant already has given the reason for a necessary God. “To be happy is necessarily the desire of every rational finite being, and thus it is an unavoidable finite being, and thus it is an unavoidable determinant of its faculty of desire.” Kant introduces God as a reward giver for the moral worthiness of human beings. For him God is the only one who sees the intention behind the deeds of the individual. The individual may not always get the correct remark from the community for one’s deeds and often may get blamed for one’s action, without looking into the intension of one’s act. So he introduced God to solve this problem, and to initiate man to live a trustworthy life.

This notion seems rational, but it has some problem. Kant introduced God as a reward giver for the moral worthiness of the individual. The first problem is that, if Kant’s thought is accepted, God will be placed just as reward giver for the actions of human being which will result in pragmatism. Secondly, God is placed as reward giver for the moral actions of individual, and if there is no human being there won’t be moral acts. Thus according to Kant’s thought if there are no human beings then the existence of God is questioned.

3.3 CRITICISM OF KANT’S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES

In his book Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, philosopher Immanuel Kant gives a concise definition of his basis for morals, which he calls the categorical imperative. Kant states “There is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative and it is this: “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” This is the foundational element of his entire system of morals.

The common blame against Kant’s ethics is the claim that the Categorical Imperative is empty, trivial or purely formal and identifies no principles of duty. This criticism holds mainly by Hegel and J.S. Mill in their works. On Kant’s view, the demand for universalizable maxims is a demand that our fundamental principles are fit for adoption by all. This condition can seem pointless: because no well formed act description can be prescribed by a universal principle. Common principles like steal when you can or kill when it isn’t risky cannot be made universalizable. This reductio ad absurdum of universalizability is achieved by replacing Kant’s Categorical imperative with a different principle. Kant gives certain examples to say about the application of the categorical imperative. For example a man who sees someone in need but declines to offer help. According to Kant such a situation would not be moral. The reasons he gives are not on the grounds of a wrong committed against the other person, but because the action cannot be applied universally. Kant’s position is that we all are persons who need help, and if the maxim is applied categorically, we would all be denied the help we needed. If this law is applied universally, if anyone in the society were to desire help, including ourselves, it would be a categorical imperative that we do not render help to anyone. Such a maxim of ignoring those who are suffering is perfectly rational and meets the categorical imperative, and if the categorical imperative is applied consistently, it is reasonable violates no reason or logic. But it violates the universal moral law engrained on human hearts, which everyone including Kant finds it morally reprehensible.

Kant’s application of the categorical imperative here is inconsistent, in fact only due to his inability to view situations apart from his concept of Christian perspective. The system of Kant worked for a long time because he lived in a time where Christian doctrines where so influencing. But if it is applied to a society of complete absence from a theistic moral perspective, Kant’s categorical imperative becomes quite immoral. The formula of universal law demands not just that we formulate a universal principle incorporating some act- description that applies to a given act. It demands that an agent’s maxim, or fundamental principle, be such that the agent can will it as universal law. The test requires dedication to be normal, predictable consequences of principles to which the agent is committed and to normal standards of instrumental rationality. When maxims are non – universalizable, commitment to the consequences of their universal adoption would be incompatible with commitment to the means of acting on them.

Kant’s account of universalizability has two problems. First, it does not refer to what universally done. Second, it is a procedure only for picking out the maxims that must be rejected if the fundamental principles of a life or a society are to be universalizable. Non – universalizable principles are identified in order to discover the side constraints on the more specific principles agents may adopt. These side constraints enable us to identify more specific but still indeterminate principles of obligation. The following is a detailed description about the above said facts on Categorical Imperatives.

The first categorical imperative states that: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.” Kant introduces this imperative in his ethics in order to establish a water tight law in making people to act well and good in the society. An imperative where giving permission to act upon one’s own will under the condition that, his action should be able to perform universally, is acceptable because it makes the person to think whether each of his/her action is universally acceptable or not. But at the same time while looking deep into it, there seem some problems for this imperative. These problems are fourfold:

The first, problem can be explained with an example, if a jar contains only purple and red jelly beans, then if you remove all the red jelly beans then there remain only purple jelly beans. It seems wrong to think that; an imperative can contain universality and an end, in the same way a jar can contain two flavors of jelly beans. If it is related with the concept of form and matter of the imperative, then their relation seems quite different: because, they cannot exist independently. There is no such thing as form without matter or matter without form. If we 'remove' the matter of a proposition, that is exactly like removing the proposition as such and there remains nothing left. The notion of a proposition that has nothing to it except a universal form, without any particular content, seems to be meaningless.

The second problem is that, the reason behind obeying the categorical imperative is supposed to be a good thing is that, to do so constitutes conforming one's actions to law as such or the universality of law as such. That there is no such thing as conformity to law as such should be evident. The problem is that as Kant says, we cannot confirm the universality of the law as such but we can confirm only to a particular law. For example, doing harm to others is wrong. But in certain circumstances it can be used as a self protection of the life of the individual.

The third problem is that, the first categorical imperative doesn't really tell us what actions to be performed. Instead, it tells us what sort of maxims to act on, or in other words, under what maxims to perform the actions. The categorical imperative represents a test on maxims or rules of conduct; that is, a necessary condition of their acceptability. This would be all right, if only the condition were strict enough to determine a unique set of acceptable rules, or, excluding that, at least a greatly limited number.

While analyzing the first categorical imperative we come to know the fact that categorical imperatives says very little about morality. The first categorical imperative rules out actions whose maxims include (by definition) the fact that other people are not doing the same thing. For example, if a person tries to write some books by way of trying to become the best philosopher in the world, or if the same person tries to be the best at anything, his/her maxim would not be universalizable. An individual could not choose that everybody be the best. By the way, this is of course a counter-example to the Kantian principle. There is nothing wrong with trying to be the best. There is nothing wrong as such with doing things that, if someone does them, other person cannot.

The second Categorical imperative is that, “act so as to treat man, in your own person as well as in that of anyone else, always as an end, never merely as a means.” Its first problem is ambiguity. That is because I know how to treat a state of affairs as an end (namely, try to bring it about), but I don't know how to treat an entity as an end. There arise a question, does treating a person as an end mean treating his existence as an end? Should we, then, simply try to maximize the number of rational beings existing? Kant does not say anything that sounds like this, but in his second discussion of the honored duties towards others, he implies that treating people as ends means treating their happiness as an end. This is why we have a duty of helping people to achieve what they want. But there seems a contradiction in his claim and rest of Kant's theory seems unclear, since he previously insisted upon the utter worthlessness of all objects of inclination.

If moral virtue is infinitely better than happiness and pleasure, then, just as we must always sacrifice our own pleasure to moral virtue, must we not also sacrifice others' happiness for the sake of moral virtue? Wouldn't the proper thing be to treat people's moral virtue as an end, rather than either their happiness or their existence? Thus we should have to go about preaching constantly to each other. This need not involve harm to their happiness, but with the Kantian doctrine of the incommensurability of values, it is unlikely anybody's happiness would ever influence our actions. Although it's a theoretical possibility that two actions could result in the same amount of moral virtue in the world but one produce more happiness, so that the latter should be chosen, it is infinitely unlikely this would ever happen. That two quantities should be exactly equal, or that an action influencing our happiness should have no effect whatsoever on our moral virtue, is an extremely small possibility. We therefore can for all practical purposes disregard about any concerns of benefitting others or ourselves, and focus all our energies on trying to get people to obey the categorical imperative.

While analyzing the Categorical Imperative there arise a question why should we treat people as end and never merely as means? The answer we get will be that, it is because human being possesses intrinsic, incommensurable value. Then why do human beings possess such value? The answer will be they are capable to act morally and dutiful action is the incomparable good in the world. According to Kant, there are duties, but he didn’t think that action according to false moral principles as good. Moral action is good only if we act according to our obligation. And when we go deep into the concept of duty, we come to know that the duty there is to treat the humanity as ends. The absolute worth human being can be warranted if only if Kant can show his argument as obligation. I think while analyzing the concept of obligation in Kant he tried to point out that, if there is an obligation, it is an obligation to do an act rather than seeing whether the other person does it.

The second Categorical Imperative can be analyzed with certain exemplar situations. If taking the situation of committing suicide, according to Kant’s thinking a person commits suicide because, the person sees himself /herself as a means instead of an end. It is a case of treating one’s existence as a means for one’s happiness. If happiness of humanity is the end, then any one can commit suicide, because people commit suicide to get away from pain. This is said to be a great fault that Kant made in the concept of treating humanity as an end.

Taking the case of breaking the promise, it constitutes treating other person as means, namely the person to whom the promise was made. The problem here is that according to Kant’s concept it failed to treat the other person’s happiness as an end in itself. Because breaking the promise probably turns the promise unhappy. Thus according to Kant this action becomes immoral.

The practical implication of second Categorical Imperative seems to turn negative impacts in the society. While analyzing the meaning of treating humanity as an end, it seems to be treating the perfection of humanity as an end in itself. Since this may interfere with taking our happiness as an end in itself, we should be equally entitled to say that the person who develops his talents is failing to regard himself (his happiness) as an end, as to say the person who neglects his talents fails to regard himself as an end.

Another problem regarding this is that, Kant reverts to the idea of treating humanity's happiness as an end when he discusses the duty to help others. But once again Kant's principle turns against him. He uses it to show that egoism, and refusing to help others, is wrong, but can't it just as well be used to argue that altruism is wrong? For, isn't the altruist just using himself as a means for the sake of others' happiness? For example, if taking money from other people to use on yourself is treating them merely as means and not as ends (and presumably taking their money for any purpose, even to help some third party, would also be treating them as means) then surely taking your own money and using it on others, by analogy, is treating yourself as a means. Since the reason given for the second Categorical Imperative is the absolute and incomparable value of human beings, there is no way to make choices between people. Since one cannot compare the value of one person to that of another person, or to anything else, in a situation in which one is given a choice between different people (suppose there are a limited number of life jackets in a sinking boat), there is nothing one can do. If values are incommensurable, we cannot say a hundred deaths are worse than one.

In many cases this theory seems irrational. It ignores the fact that there are situations in which we are forced to compare values. For example, the ruling government has to decide, how much money to spend on health care if they take health as an important value, and then there is no doubt on how much it can consume from the entirety of the gross national product of the country, and leave no time or resources for anything else. This is what absolute value in this sense will do. So it is logically impossible to have multiple absolute and superseding values, they may come into conflict, in which they cannot both be treated as absolute. Moreover, the concept of incomparable values ends in mathematical absurdity. That is the notion of a quantity that is neither greater nor less than, nor yet equal to, is a mathematical absurdity.

CONCLUSION

Kant’s ethical thought is one of the few products of the history of philosophy that exercise such a strong continuing influence on us that replacing commonly accepted ideas about it with more accurate and less oversimplified ones might help to transform our conception of our own history and of ourselves as heirs of the enlightenment. In this chapter I made an attempt to evaluate Kantian ethical principles in the light of contemporary ethical situations.

Kantian conceptions of autonomy, free will, obligation, categorical imperatives and postulates of morality seem to be effective in the contemporary society too. The concept of autonomy shows the fact that, as rational beings, human beings are capable of legislating moral laws by their own, without any pressure from outside. Human being is the part of certain kinds of external inclinations, but the effective understanding of autonomy enables humans to become free.

We have to conclude that, no philosophy, or moral thoughts were capable of giving a final solution for the problems of the society. New moral consciousnesses develop when one supersedes the other. Thus when we analyze Kant’s moral philosophy, though it cannot give a complete answer to the problems of mankind, in many ways, in the present society, in the realms of considering the dignity of human beings and promoting individual freedom Kantian moral principles are applicable.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

“Change is the ultimate principle of universe”, said by Heraclitus. He affirmed it by saying, “One man cannot step twice into the same river. As they step into the same rivers, other and still other waters flow upon them.” While considering moral principles which humans uphold, I think the above statement is true. The society which man lives is changing. When we say about the changes in the society, actually we are speaking about the changes in its culture. In a deep study on the cultural change, we come to know that what actually changes is the moral nature of the society. This change in the moral consciousness is that what reflects in the lifestyle of individual’s life patterns such as; family, religion, relationships, fashions etc.

While comparing the past years, the contemporary society which we live today has undergone many changes. If we take the example of women in the Indian society, the very ancient society considered women as goddess and as light of the house and gave her great honor. But in the medieval era, she is treated like a slave, who must be obedient to men. The best example for this was the practice of Sati and the Devadasi system. Today, the society began to think about the dignity of women, and has started the slogan of women empowerment. But one thing to be remembered is that, in either of these cases, the moral consciousnesses imprinted in the humanity were not changed. What actually happened was that, the compression or imprisonment of genuine morality by a mightier society. Yet, there heard in the human heart the sigh for an evoking right morality.

Today, we are living in a consumerist society, where the value of everything is determined by the availability of the profit. Thus relationships, education, medical services etc. has lost its original purity. In such a society, I think there starts the relevance for such a strong ethical principle of Immanuel Kant. Kantian ethics is grounded on the dignity of rational nature. While deciding to take Kantian philosophy to analyze moral nature of human being, what was actually in my mind was, his ethical thought is much useful in the present changing society. Especially, I was attracted by his categorical imperatives, which proclaims for a universal acceptable maxim and the concept of accepting humanity as an end in themselves. In this dissertation my attempt was to find out whether, Kantian moral principle is an answer for the contemporary social problems.

Kantian philosophy was an intellectual movement of the enlightenment period. It was an answer for the many then existing evils in the society. The enlightenment still exists today, since many people throughout the world still struggle for the expansion of liberty in human thought and action, equality in social, political and economic spheres and tolerance regarding religious and cultural diversity. I think Kantian morality is capable of upholding the dignity and freedom of individuals even in the present society.

The concept of autonomy is the core of his moral theory. He is in the position that rational human wills are autonomous, which involves two components; the first is that, no authority external to ourselves is needed to constitute or inform us of the demands of morality. Each of us can know without being told what we ought to do, because moral requirements are requirements we impose on ourselves. The second is that in self-government we can effectively control ourselves. The obligations we impose upon ourselves supersede all other calls for action, and often run counter to our desires. Thus his conception of autonomy itself tries to uphold the individual dignity.

One of the important features of Kant’s ethics is that, the change that he made from objective morality to that of subjective morality. His conception of categorical imperatives is an example for this. In a positive sense is highly useful in upholding the individual dignity. The notion of self legislature of the law insists upon the autonomy and supremacy of mankind. His first proclamation, in a positive sense is useful if all people can uphold it. But it becomes useless in the negative sense, because an individual may not be able to uphold a particular principle in an ideal manner. The second categorical imperative is much useful in the present society. When Kant says to treat human as an end, he meaning he gives for end is happiness. Here Kant induces us to think about the Platonic concept of Happiness. One of the problems regarding this imperative is that if people do not understand the exact meaning of what Kant suggested, there is a chance for others to act immorally.

Kant introduced the three postulates into his morality taking into consideration the fact that man is a creature haunted by inclinations. The postulates give strength to his ethics. For Kant, the concept of God arises because the relationship between moral law and happiness is not guaranteed in this world. Here God comes to rescue and thus necessitates the compatibility of virtue and realization of highest good. Kant introduces God as reward giver for the moral act of human being. He places God as a reward giver in order to induce human to act morally, but as mentioned earlier there is a tendency to regard Kant’s concept of God as mere pragmatism. The postulate of immortality is interwoven in the postulate of God. It is very difficult for man to be righteous without hope. Immortality guarantees a reckoning place of happiness. It is in the place of freedom that the self legislation and autonomous nature of human being has its relevance. Freedom is placed by Kant as an a priori notion for the condition moral law. It is because of the freedom that the God and immortality gets legitimacy and subjective necessity.

Kant played a central role in maintaining the value of rational nature as an end in itself. Undergoing both natural competitiveness and social antagonism, the human species, according to Kant, develops the rational capacity to struggle against its impulses toward a human community in which the ends of all are to harmonize and to coincide. Thus we have to conclude that, Kant’s ethical vision is grounded in the idea of the dignity of the rational nature of every human being.

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“The Critique of Judgment,” [online: linked from “Wikipedia free encyclopedia” home page,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ImmanuelKant. Accessed August. 5, 2012].

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HUMAN AS AN ETHICAL BEING A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY ON KANTIAN ANTHROPOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

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